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Federal Preemption of State Obscenity





John Zeh, a Cincinnati gay rights activist, produced
"Gaydreams," a weekly radio program geared to the gay com-
munity, which was broadcast Saturday afternoons. On Janu-
ary 3, 1981, in the final minutes of his program, Zeh read
portions of "A Guide for Greasy Fingers," which described the
properties of several substances used as anal lubricants by
homosexuals.' Four juveniles tape-recorded part of the broad-
cast, and their father brought the tapes to the attention of Si-
mon Leis, Jr., prosecutor for Hamilton County, Ohio. Zeh and
radio station WAIF were indicted on four counts of recklessly
and knowingly presenting obscene material, in Violation of
Ohio Revised Code, section 2907.31.2 Although only one pre-
sentation was broadcast, each juvenile hearing the program
constituted a separate count in the indictment. Consequently,
Judge Peter Outcalt dismissed the charges because there was
an abuse of due process. The court reasoned that such logic
* B.A., University of Denver, 1960; M.A., Miami University (Ohio), 1962; Ph.D.,
University of Pittsburgh, 1970. Professor of telecommunications regulation and video
production at Miami University (Ohio).
** Senior in Mass Communication, Miami University (Ohio), and will begin law
school in the fall of 1983.
1. The transcript of the broadcast reads, in part, "Here's a guide to greasy fingers
conducted by Gaydreams listeners over the holidays. Crisco has its advantages, no
taste. It's really slick with a good deal of body so it doesn't slide off when working
against the resistance of a tight sphincter muscle."
2. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.31 (Page 1982) provides: "No person, with knowl-
edge of its character, shall recklessly furnish or present to a juvenile any material or
performance which is obscene or harmful to juveniles.... [Further,] if the material
or performance involved is harmful to juveniles but not obscene, violation of this sec-
tion is a misdemeanor of the first degree. If the material or performance involved is
obscene, violation of this section is a felony of the fourth degree."
Ohio v. John Zeh & Stepchild Radio, Indictment for Disseminating Matter Harmful to
Juveniles, Hamilton County Common Pleas, No. B810805 (February 17, 1981).
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would eventually enable the state to list each suggested lubri-
cating substance as a separate count of the indictment: the
Crisco count, the Vaseline count, the butter count or the ba-
nana count.' In addition, no specific presentation was made di-
rectly to a juvenile; rather, the broadcast was made to the
general public.
4
Zeh and WAIF moved to dismiss on the grounds of vague-
ness of the law and federal preemption of state obscenity law.
The prosecutor opposed the preemption motion, claiming that
Miller v. California5 precluded federal preemption of state ob-
scenity law in broadcasting by establishing that obscenity
would be judged by local rather than national standards.6 The
court denied the motions to dismiss on both grounds. How-
ever, it dismissed the claim for federal preemption without giv-
ing any reasons.7 The court simply stated that the community
standard for material suitable for juveniles could be deter-
mined as easily as the community standards for obscenity.
Although the court did not address the merits of the obscen-
ity question, Ohio v. John Zeh and Stepchild Radio raises an
important issue of federal preemption.8 This issue is espe-
cially timely because of the growth of interstate telecommuni-
cations via satellite to cable systems across the country and
because of the prospect of interstate broadcasts to homes di-
rectly from satellite to home receiving dishes. For example,
Home Box Office (HBO) distributes the same movie simulta-
neously to cable television systems in many states. Although
R-rated and X-rated' uncut movies are not broadcast on televi-
3. Ohio v. John Zeh & Stepchild Radio, Opinion In Regard to Motions, Court of
Common Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio, at 3 (August 25, 1981).
4. Id. at 2.
5. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
6. Brief of Plaintiff, Ohio v. Zeh.
7. Ohio v. John Zeh and Stepchild Radio, Opinion In Regard to Motions, supra
note 3, at 3, 4.
8. Unfortunately, the federal preemption issue was not reviewed by a superior
court because the defendant's appeal was precluded by dismissal on other grounds.
9. R and X are two ratings used by the Motion Picture Association of America to
characterize films. This is how the Association describes films in each of its rating
categories:
G: "This is a film which contains nothing in theme, language, nudity and sex, or
violence which would.., be offensive to parents whose younger children view the
film."
PG: "This is a fim which clearly needs to be examined or inquired about by par-
ents before they let their younger children attend. There may be profanity in these
films, but harsher sexually derived words will vault a PG rating into the R category.
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sion for the general public, they can be seen on cable and on-
air subscription TV when special equipment is installed at the
expense of the subscriber. 10 The degree of eroticism available
through cable and subscription TV makes these services more
likely first-targets of moralists who wish to restrict the audi-
ence's program choices. If a state or a city applies local ob-
scenity laws to signals originating in other states, then,
theoretically, the least liberal community could control what
the rest of the country might be able to receive through sub-
scription telecommunication services. For example, Dallas,
Texas' cable programming ordinance" prohibits X-rated mov-
ies without requiring that such movies be found obscene by
local community standards. 2 As more cities develop cable sys-
tems and as subscription television expands, the viewer's free-
dom of choice may shrink unless federal law preempts state
laws affecting telecommunications program content.
Where state and federal law require contradictory behavior,
federal law preempts state law.'3 Sometimes, uncertainty
arises where federal and state law seem to be compatible, but
There may be violence, but it is not deemed so strong that everyone under 17 need be
restricted unless accompanied by a parent."
R: "This is an adult film in some of its aspects and treatment so far as language,
violence, nudity, sexuality or other content is concerned. The language may be rough,
the violence may be hard, and while explicit sex is not to be found in R-rated films,
nudity and lovemaking may be involved...."
X: "This is patently an adult film and no children are allowed to attend... X does
not necessarily mean obscene or pornographic in terms of sex or violence. The Rating
Board does not attempt to mark films as obscene or pornographic; that is for the courts
to decide. The reason for not admitting children to X-rated films can relate to the ac-
cumulation of brutal or sexually connected language or of explicit sex or excessive and
sadistic violence."
10. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater New York, Inc. 467 F. Supp. 525,
528 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), which held that subscription programs are "intended to be re-
ceived not by 'the general public' but only by paying subscribers."
11. Dallas, Tex., Cable Programming Ord. No. 16741 (Nov. 5, 1981).
12. See supra note 5. The Court in Miller articulated a test to determine obscenity:
(1) whether the average person applying contemporary community standards, would
find the material taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest; (2) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value. The Court indicated the kinds of patently
offensive representations or descriptions of sexual acts, excretory functions and lewd
exhibition of the genitals which could be called obscene. Finally, the Court said a local
community rather than a national community should be used as the community stan-
dard for judging offensiveness to the community.
13. See D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: FEDERAL AND STATE 320 (1974). See
also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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conflict beneath the surface. 4 This was the case in Zeh. This
article examines two important questions raised by Zeh. First,
on what grounds might federal law preempt the application of
state obscenity law to broadcasting? Second, how does the
Miller v. California 15 "local community standard" test apply to
the federally regulated medium of broadcasting?
II
Grounds for Preemption
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution is
the basis for federal preemption: "This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding."'16  In broadcasting, the
Supremacy Clause and Commerce Clause preempted state law
as early as 1931. In Station WBT, Inc. v. Poulnot'7 the district
court ruled that South Carolina's tax on radio receivers hin-
dered Congress' ability to regulate broadcasting as interstate
commerce. Congressional power "is necessarily exclusive
whenever the subjects are national in their character or admit
only of one uniform system or plan of regulation."' 8 In 1959,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that federal law pre-
empted state law in Farmers Educational and Cooperative
Union v. WDA Y, Inc. ,"9 when North Dakota's defamation law
conflicted with section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934.20
14. See D. ENGDAHL, supra note 13, at 336-37.
15. See supra note 5.
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
17. 46 F.2d 671 (E.D.S.C. 1931).
18. Id. at 675.
19. 360 U.S. 525 (1959). In Farmers, a state candidate for public office had accused
the farmers' union of trying to establish a communist state, and the farmers sued the
candidate and the radio station. The United States Supreme Court held that North
Dakota defamation law was preempted by congressional design as expressed in sec-
tion 315.
20. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (a) provides:
(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candi-
date for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of cen-
sorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No
obligation is imposed under this subsection upon any licensee to allow the use
of its station by any such candidate. Appearance by any legally qualified can-
didate on any (1) bona fide newscast, (2) bona fide news interview, (3) bona
fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is incidental to the
[Vol. 5
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Although section 315 did not literally require a broadcaster to
air a candidate's speech,2 its purpose was to promote open de-
bate and provide access to broadcasting for political
candidates.
Justice Frankfurter dissented in Farmers because he be-
lieved that only an explicit statement from Congress granting
immunity from defamation suits or consistent administrative
rulings by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to
that effect would justify federal preemption. 22 The Court's ma-
jority disagreed and inferred that congressional intent for sec-
tion 315 would be hindered by applying defamation law to
broadcasters because broadcasters were required to provide
access to candidates but were prohibited from controlling the
content of a candidate's message.23 Judicial interpretation of
congressional intent prevented broadcasters from denying ac-
cess despite section 315's language to the contrary.
A. Congressional Intent
Federal preemption of state obscenity law applied to broad-
casting requires evidence of congressional intent to occupy the
field.24  However, an inference of such intent regarding one
area of broadcast law, such as section 315, does not, by itself,
justify federal preemption in all possible areas of concurrent
state/federal law. For instance, a savings clause reserving
state remedial power appears in section 414 of the Communica-
tions Act.21 "Remedies" has generally been construed to mean
a private right of action rather than a criminal action,26 but
Farmers demonstrates that a judicial finding of congressional
intent to preempt may supplant even the express savings
subjects or presentation of the subjects covered by the news documentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited to
political conventions and activities incidental thereto), shall not be deemed to
be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning of this subsection. Noth-
ing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in
connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news docu-
mentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation im-
posed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to
afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues
of public importance.
21. Farmers, 360 U.S. at 526.
22. Id. at 536.
23. Id. at 531.
24. See generally D. ENGDAHL, supra note 13, at 327-332.
25. 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1976).
26. See State Regulation of Radio and Television, 73 HARV. L REv. 390 (1959).
No. 11
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clause in section 414. Congress, therefore, has not reserved for
the states the power to punish obscenity in broadcasting.
Where there are no express savings clauses or express pre-
emption clauses in a statute, congressional intent to preempt
may be inferred from legislative history. Legislative history,
however, often provides statements supporting several differ-
ent intents, and the Supreme Court generally has not found it
persuasive.
The Constitution evidently intended Congress itself to reduce
the conflicting and tentative views of its members to an agreed
formula .... How far, then, should this formal text and con-
text be qualified or amplified by expressions of one or several
Congressmen in reports or debates which did not find place in
the enactment itself?
28
Other indications of congressional intent may be found in ju-
dicial interpretations, but state and federal courts have not yet
ruled conclusively on the question of whether federal law
preempts state obscenity law applied to broadcasting. Still, Al-
len B. Dumont Labs, Inc. v. Carroll29 may be the leading case in
the area.30 Dumont dealt with prior restraint in Pennsylvania's
censorship of TV movies. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
in Dumont broadly stated that "it is clear that Congress has
occupied fully the field of television regulation and that that
field is no longer open to the States."'3 1 Dumont could have
been decided more narrowly under the Commerce Clause:
submitting each film to state agency for review would render
the timely scheduling of films on a television station nearly im-
possible, thereby unduly burdening a station's ability to en-
gage in interstate commerce.2 Another narrow alternative for
27. See A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978).
28. Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court
Says, 34 A.B.A.J. 535, 538 (1948); see also D. ENGDAHL, supra note 12.
29. 184 F.2d 153 (3rd Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1952).
30. See State Regulation of Radio and Television, supra note 26.
31. Dumont, 184 F.2d at 156.
32. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); see also Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963). In Bibb, Illinois law required con-
toured mudflaps on trucks but other states required straight mudflaps. Interstate
Commerce Commission regulations expressly left mudflaps to be regulated by the
states. The conflict between state regulations imposed an unreasonable burden on in-
terstate commerce in the eyes of the Court, which held that Illinois' regulation was
preempted by the Commerce Clause. In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, the Court
held that the state of California could impose more stringent tests than federal regula-
tion required for the sale of avocados. 'That no state may completely exclude feder-
ally licensed commerce is indisputable, but ... [t Ihe test [of preemption I is whether
[Vol. 5
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declaring Pennsylvania's censorship unlawful is section 326 of
the Communications Act 3 3 which denies federal censorship
power.34 Dumont recognized congressional intent to preempt
state censorship of television, but it does not seem to extend so
far as to imply that state obscenity laws are preempted in
broadcasting. Thus, the Supreme Court has cited Dumont :5
only to support proscription of state censorship. Because Du-
mont is limited to the prohibition of state censorship, the ques-
tion whether state obscenity law is preempted by federal
communications law should be approached by identifying fed-
both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the
field. ... Id. at 142. The Court further specified this test for preemption: "either
that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the
Congress has so unmistakenly ordained." Id. In Dumont, one could reasonably con-
clude that, because broadcasting is interstate and because different states could im-
pose different criteria in prior approval of films, states licensing inherently imposed
conflicts which burden interstate commerce. Further, it is reasonable to conclude that
federal law and state law could not stand without endangering federal superinten-
dence under the Communications Act:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commis-
sion the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals trans-
mitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be
promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of
free speech by means of radio communication.
47 U.S.C.A. § 326. It would seem quite unlikely that Congress intended for states to
have the power of censorship which it explicitly denied to the Commission. See also
Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851),
which established by general criterion that state regulation which impinges on inter-
state commerce should be preempted only when interstate commerce was signifi-
cantly disrupted and when state regulation did not protect some vital and/or peculiar
interest of the state.
33. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976).
34. The unique nature of federal regulation of broadcast program content stands
out by comparing section 326 of the Communications Act, which prohibits state censor-
ship, with allowable prior restraint of films in theaters. See Times Film Corp. v. City of
Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961). Prior restraint of films shown in theaters has been consist-
ently regarded as acceptable by the Supreme Court on the ground that movies are not
subject to the rules for other methods of expression; but see also Freedman v. Mary-
land, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), in which the Court required that, within the shortest possible
time, any film in question be proven to fit the category of unprotected expression; and
see Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980), in which the court held
that a judge may not prohibit the exhibition of movies which have not been found
obscene simply because obscene movies have been shown in the past by an exhibitor.
35. See Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963). In Head,
New Mexico prohibited optometric advertising on television. Although the advertising
could be received in Texas where it was legal, the court rejected the argument that
federal law was so comprehensive as to preempt New Mexico law and that such law
unduly burdened interstate commerce.
See also Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 364 (1959). In Kingsley, the
Court held that New York state had exceeded its authority by banning the film of Lady
Chatterly's Lover, since the film had not been found obscene.
COMM/ENT L. J.
eral objectives and by inferring from judicial interpretation
concerning those objectives. If a state law impedes a federal
objective, it should be preempted.
36
The objective of The Communications Act is "to make avail-
able, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a
rapid, efficient, nationwide3" and world-wide wire and radio
communication service . . . consistent with the public inter-
est."38 States may frustrate federal radio service by interpret-
ing and applying their individual Miller local community
standard. For example, assume an X-rated or R-rated movie
transmitted via scrambled signal free-air broadcasting to sub-
scribers who wished to receive the program in Cincinnati, Ohio
and in Covington, Kentucky, a city which receives Cincinnati
broadcast signals. Under the Miller community standard, a
Cincinnati court may find the film to be obscene according to
its community standard. At the same time, a Covington, Ken-
tucky court may find the same film not obscene by Covington
community standards. Ohio state obscenity law could deter-
mine what an audience in Covington could view, and to that
extent broadcasting would be regulated as a state, not an inter-
state, service.
Even if state law could conceivably hinder the objective of
establishing a national service, then federal preemption may
still be limited. For example, Maurer v. Hamilton39 acknowl-
edged that the 1935 Motor Carrier Act's objective was "to pre-
serve and foster the economic and commercial advantages of
an efficient transportation system." 0 But it concluded that a
Pennsylvania state law which banned vehicles from carrying
any other vehicles above the cab of the carrier was not pre-
empted by the Carrier Act because Pennsylvania's law pro-
tected public safety and therefore imposed an acceptable
hindrance to a federal objective.4 Similarly, in California v.
Zook42 the Federal Motor Carrier Act did not preempt a Cali-
fornia statute which required a permit from the Interstate
Commerce Commission for sale of transportation across state
36. See A Framework for Preemption Analysis, supra note 27. See also D. ENG-
DAHL, supra note 13.
37. Emphasis added.
38. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
39. 309 U.S. 598 (1940).
40. Id. at 606.
41. Id. at 614.
42. 336 U.S. 725.
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lines. The Supreme Court concluded that state law was no
more of a hindrance to federal objectives than federal law."
The Supreme Court examined federal objectives related to
broadcasting in Head v. New Mexico." Justice Brennan's con-
curring opinion emphasized that New Mexico's prohibition of
optometric price advertising protected the health and safety of
consumers. While the prohibition might hinder development
of a perfectly uniform national broadcasting system, it was not
preempted by the Communications Act because it was
"designed principally to protect the State's consumers against
a local evil by local application to forbid certain forms of adver-
tising in all mass media."4 It was not a significant hindrance to
Congress' objective. Brennan also noted that regulation of the
state's nondeceptive advertising was not dealt with in the
Communications Act, whereas broadcast obscenity was.46
Thus, he contrasted an area of state law not mentioned in fed-
eral law, to obscenity, which is mentioned in federal law.47 It is
possible to infer from this distinction that in the eyes of the
Court, Congress intended to preempt state obscenity law.
Care must be taken not to infer that preemption was in-
tended in every case where state law could prevent a broad-
caster from securing a license. In Regents of the University
Systems of Georgia v. Carroll,48 the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) renewed a radio license only after the ap-
plicant carried out a required repudiation of a contract which
provided that another party would operate the station, with the
licensee exercising only nominal authority.49 The Commission
had determined that unless the contract were repudiated, re-
newal of the license would not be in the public interest.50 The
Court in Carroll held that Congress did not grant the FCC the
authority to void contracts which were valid according to state
courts, even though the FCC had required repudiation of such
a contract as a condition of granting a license.5 '
No state or federal court has directly addressed the question
43. Id. at 735.
44. 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
45. Id. at 445.
46. Id. at 444.
47. Id.
48. 338 U.S. 586 (1950).
49. Id. at 587, 589.
50. Id. at 587.
51. Id. at 602.
No. 11
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of whether state obscenity law is a significant hindrance to a
federal objective or whether there are other grounds for fed-
eral preemption. However, the United States Supreme Court
has affirmed FCC authority to regulate obscenity, indecency
and profanity far more broadly than any state is empowered to
do.
52
The Supreme Court, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,3 ruled
that the FCC has power to regulate a radio broadcast that is
indecent but not obscene, under both 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and 47
U.S.C. § 303(g).54 In Pacifica, WBAI-FM, New York City, li-
52. Under section 503 of the Communications Act, the FCC may issue Notice of
Apparent Liability and propose forfeiture of up to $2,000 per day for violations of fed-
eral broadcast obscenity law. 47 U.S.C. § 503 reads, in relevant part: "Any person who
is determined by the Commission ... to have violated any provision of section 1304,
1343, or 1464 of title 18 [United States Code] shall be liable to the United States for a
forfeiture penalty." 18 U.S.C. § 1464 states: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Notices of Apparent Liability
have been issued and the courts have confirmed FCC authority to regulate not only
obscene but indecent speech as well.
53. 438 U.S. 726 (1979). Pacifica appealed and the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia reversed the FCC under 18 U.S.C. § 1464: "whoever utters
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both," and under
47 U.S.C. § 303(g); which empowers the Commission to "encourage the larger and more
effective use of radio in the public interest." "[A]lthough the First Amendment pro-
tects newspaper publishers from being required to print the replies of those whom
they criticize . . .it affords no such protection to broadcasters .... The reasons for
these distinctions are complex ... the broadcast media have established a uniquely
pervasive presence." Id. at 748. Note also, Interstate Circuit Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390
U.S. 676 (1968), in which the Court found overbroad a statute which prohibited "cruel,
obscene, indecent, or immoral" content in movies. Clearly, the federal regulation of
broadcasting is comprehensive while state regulation of media is not. That compre-
hensiveness is grounds for inference of congressional intent to preempt state law is
apparent in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); and Rice v. Board
of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947). In the former case, there was an express preemption
clause but in the latter there was not; nevertheless, some application of state law was
preempted in Rice because of the comprehensiveness of federal law.
See also Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. Federal Communications
Commission in which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals similarly upheld FCC
power to define as obscene a radio call-in show which "during daytime hours broad-
casts explicit discussions of ultimate sexual acts in a titillating context ... ." 515 F.2d
397, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
54. 47 U.S.C. § 303 reads, in part: "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter,
the Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity re-
quires, shall:
(m) (1) Have authority to suspend the license of any operator upon proof sufficient
to satisfy the Commission that the licensee...
(D) [H]as transmitted superfluous radio, communications... containing profane
or obscene words, language, or meaning ....
The FCC also has the power to impose a number of penalties such as simple letters
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censed to the Pacifica Foundation, played a George Carlin
monologue, "Filthy Words," which was heard by a man and his
son while driving in their car. The man complained to the FCC
which issued an opinion that the words contained in the mono-
logue were indecent when broadcast at a time when children
were in the audience. The Supreme Court held that the FCC
has the power to fine broadcasters for indecent speech, empha-
sizing the uniqueness of broadcasting and the consequent
need for comprehensive regulation as distinguished from other
media. A broadcaster may be deprived of his license and his
forum if the Commission decides that such an action would
serve the public interest, convenience and necessity."
The FCC's comprehensive authority over indecent and ob-
scene program supports an inference that Congress intended
to preempt state obscenity law in broadcasting. This inference
gains strength since the FCC is charged with the affirmative
task of developing broadcasting in the public interest.
5 6 If
states could prosecute broadcasters for violation of state ob-
scenity laws, the probability of prosecutions would increase
without regard to the general public interest, particularly in
light of the apparent lack of knowledge or respect for first
amendment rights reflected in some states.57
Further support given by the Court in Pacifica for compre-
hensive federal regulation of obscene programs was a compari-
of reprimand, cease-and-desist orders, forfeitures, short-term license renewals, revoca-
tion of licenses, and nonrenewal of licenses. See Clift, Weiss & Abel, Ten Years of For-
feitures by the Federal Communications Commission, 15 J. BROADCASTING 379 (1971),
which reports that over the ten-year period after the FCC issued its policy and proce-
dures for forfeitures, violations of 18 U.S.C., covering lottery, fraud, and obscene and
indecent language, accounted for 1.4% of forfeiture notices.
55. Pacifica, 439 U.S. at 748.
56. It is significant that states have an interest in protecting the health and safety
of citizens within their borders. Vital state interests are generally preserved by a
heavy presumption against preemption, and state attempts at territorial protection of
less-than-vital interests have received considerable protection. See A Framework for
Preemption Analysis, supra note 27, at 389.
57. See Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980), in which a Texas
nuisance statute allowed judges to prohibit future motion picture exhibits of material
not yet judged obscene; Lagoda Canning Corp. v. McKenzie, 370 So. 2d 1137 (1979), in
which a Florida court enjoined booksellers from distribution of unnamed printed ma-
terial which was obscene, absent a judicial determination of obscenity of any specific
material; Brightbill v. Rigo, Inc., 5 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 2496 (Pa. Super Ct. 1980), in
which a lower court enjoined sale or distribution of material alleged to be obscene and
"any other book or magazine of the like kind or similar kind,"; and Penthouse Interna-
tional, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 931 (1980), in
which a sheriff illegally seized magazines he. alleged to be obscene.
No. 11
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son of federal authority to control obscene matter in the
mails5 8 to the broader authority in broadcasting:
59
[The former] deals primarily with printed matter enclosed in a
sealed envelope mailed from one individual to another; the lat-
ter deals with the content of public broadcast. It is unrealistic
to assume that Congress intended to impose precisely the
same limitations on the dissemination of patently offensive
matter by such different means.6 °
Congress chose to regulate broadcasting comprehensively.
The Court thus affirmed that the FCC should have uniquely
broad authority because broadcasting is unique among infor-
mation systems. This broad power, however, rests on the abil-
ity of the FCC and the federal courts to define the public to be
served. In many, if not all instances, the public is interstate in
nature. For these reasons, an inference is warranted that Con-
gress intended to preempt state obscenity law applied to
broadcasting or to cablecasting which is interstate.
B. The Commerce Clause
The fact that Congress regulates broadcasting as interstate
commerce does not, in itself, justify preemption of state ob-
scenity law. As noted above in Regents v. Carroll,6' the
Supreme Court held that, although an applicant for broadcast
license had repudiated a contract with a third party as a condi-
tion set by the FCC for being granted a license, the applicant
could be held responsible for the contract under state law. The
Court reasoned that the FCC's authority to regulate broadcast-
ing, an authority delegated under the power of Congress to reg-
ulate interstate commerce, is limited to the matter which is
interstate, namely licensing and regulation.62 Burdens im-
posed upon interstate commerce must be weighed against a
specific state interest.6 The state's interest in protecting the
health and safety of its citizens may overcome the burden on
interstate commerce.
When this weighing process is applied to broadcasting and to
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 reads, in relevant part: "Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, inde-
cent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device . . . is declared to be non-mailable
matter."
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976).
60. Pacifica, 439 U.S. at 741.
61. Carroll, 338 U.S. 586 (1950).
62. Id.
63. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. at 733.
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obscenity, the burden on interstate commerce may initially ap-
pear slight compared to the state interest in protecting public
morality. But if each state which originates broadcasts reach-
ing audiences in other states can control what those audiences
may receive, the consequences could be substantial. For ex-
ample, if a television signal in Chicago were imported by sev-
eral different cable operators in various states, those audiences
in the receiving states could be restricted by Illinois law. In
such a case, the burden on interstate commerce could be so
heavy as to warrant federal preemption.64 The burden would
clearly be too great if, for example, in delivery of broadcast sig-
nals via microwave across a state, that state prevented other
states from receiving messages which were legal in those re-
ceiving states. Likewise, receiving states, assuming they pos-
sessed the authority, would unduly burden interstate
commerce by imposing sanctions on cable operators in one
state, which carried signals originating in other states. Ted
Turner's "Superstation," for example, which originates pro-
gramming in Atlanta, Georgia, telecasts to other states by sat-
ellite transmission. If state obscenity laws were applied to
such interstate transmissions, the effect would be that states
outside of Georgia could regulate, to some extent, Turner's pro-
gramming. This effect would be achieved because cable opera-
tors in receiving states would try to avoid running afoul of state
obscenity laws. In such circumstances preemption would be
appropriate to avoid interstate conflicts which would destroy
federal superintendence over the field.
Reliance on the commerce clause alone, however, for pre-
emptive capability in broadcasting and cable, would be a very
general approach and would probably necessitate a showing of
some means-to-end relation to an interstate policy objective.6
For example, consider a federal grant program to increase the
amount of farm reporting in public radio news, which requires
that the broadcaster employ, as one condition of the grant, a
number of farm reporters, some of whom have no academic de-
grees. It is conceivable that a state law requiring that employ-
ees of radio stations licensed to state universities hold certain
academic degrees could be preempted by the federal grant pro-
gram. The grants would be a means to an end proposed by
Congress. Given the analogy, it seems unlikely that there
64. See HARv. L. REV. supra note 26, at 394.
65. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
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could be such preemptive means-to-end relationship if state
obscenity laws were applied to broadcasting.
Assume for purposes of argument that Congress appropri-
ated funds to develop programs which examine sexual prac-
tices and taboos of various cultures. The ultimate objective
might be to increase intercultural understanding through in-
terstate telecommunications. Although such a situation is pos-
sible, it seems improbable that Congress would approve of that
specific means to achieve the end and equally improbable that
a court would consider the particular programming so vital to
an interstate commerce objective as to justify federal preemp-
tion of a state's obscenity law applied to the broadcast of that
programming. In short, a clear relationship between broadcast
programming about sexual material and a specific federal in-
terstate commerce objective is difficult to find. A possible ex-
ception is sex education broadcast-over-the-air for in-school
instruction across state lines. Preempting state law as applied
to such programming might avoid deciding the case on first
and fourteenth amendment grounds,66 but those are precisely
the grounds on which the law in question should be chal-
lenged. Otherwise, one would have to assume Congress in-
tended to disseminate potentially obscene material on public
airwaves over objectives of the state.
C. The First Amendment and the Supremacy Clause as Preemptive
The purpose of securing the constitutional rights of citizens
of any state is within the circle of federal authority.67 In Ala-
bama NAACP v. Wallace68 a federal district court struck down
an Alabama statute which forbade compliance with federal de-
segregation guidelines. The Alabama NAACP State Confer-
ence of Branches called such guidelines unconstitutional, but
the court ruled that under the Supremacy Clause, Congress is
empowered to secure constitutional guarantees, among them
equal protection and due process. This reasoning may apply to
broadcasting as well-Congress should be able to secure the
first amendment rights of audiences and licensees. In broad-
casting, the public receiving information enjoys a first amend-
66. See Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12
STAN. L. REv. 208, 218 (1959), where the author suggests courts may preempt to avoid
constitutional questions.
67. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XrV.
68. 269 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Ala. 1967).
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ment right. The Supreme Court has consistently placed the
interest of broadcast audiences to receive information above
the first amendment rights of the broadcast licensees to send
information. Justice White, deliving the opinion of the Court in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC69 said:
[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by
radio and their collective right to have the medium function
consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amend-
ment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters, which is paramount.... It is the right of
the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.
That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Con-
gress or by the FCC.70
If a broadcast is obscene, however, it is not protected expres-
sion under the first amendment.7 The question of whether ma-
terial is legally obscene is to be determined by local
community standards. Therefore a conflict as to whether a
broadcast should be afforded first amendment protection could
arise if neighboring states reached a different conclusion as to
whether that broadcast was obscene. Thus, if a local commu-
nity in Ohio could declare a broadcast obscene, would Ohio
then be in a position to abridge the first amendment rights of
Kentucky audiences? It would seem so if Ohio could prevent
Kentucky audiences from receiving messages which had im-
portant scientific, literary or political value 72 to a Kentucky
69. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
70. Id. at 390.
71. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), in which the Court first held
obscenity unprotected under the first and fourteenth amendments; Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184 (1964), where the relevant community standard in deciding offensiveness
of material was designated as national; and Miller v. California, which the Court desig-
nated the local community standard as appropriate to obscenity tests. See also
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), in which a plurality of the Court estab-
lished a three-part test to define obscenity, which included (1) a restatement of Roth;
(2) a requirement that the material in question violate contemporary community stan-
dards related to representation of sex; and (3) a requirement that the material be ut-
terly without redeeming social value. To be declared obscene a depiction had to meet
all three tests; Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), which shows that after
Memoirs, the Court routinely, without hearing oral argument and without offering an
opinion, reversed convictions when five members agreed that a work was not obscene;
finally, Chief Justice Burger formed a revised standard on the trier of facts stated in
Miller.
72. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, specified that, to be obscene, a work must be patently
offensive to contemporary community standards in its sexual depiction and that the
work, taken as a whole, must lack important scientific, literary, or political value.
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community. One way to ensure that first amendment interests
of broadcast and cable audiences in one state are not abridged
by another state's obscenity law is federal preemption. This
reasoning would seem appropriate whether signals reached
across state lines by broadcasting alone, by microwave or by
satellite to other broadcast stations and cable systems.
Preemption is increasingly desirable to protect the first
amendment interests of audiences as cable systems enter
more and more cities. 73 Cities and states are now regulating
"language which is obscene, indecent, or profane ' 74 through
cable programming ordinances. Such ordinances, however, ap-
pear to recognize that the FCC preempts state regulation of
movies shown on broadcast channels required by the FCC to
be carried by cable television systems. For example, the Dal-
las, Texas, Cable Programming Ordinance prohibits "movie
programming which has been rated X by the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA)," and programming which is
rated R by MPAA must be "offered to subscribers at their op-
tion."75 The ordinance exempts from these restrictions "televi-
sion signals required by the Federal Communication
Commission to be carried by cable television systems.176 This
recognition is double-edged. Therefore, on the one hand, pre-
emption by the FCC in interstate telecommunications is ac-
knowledged; on the other, state jurisdiction is asserted in
control of pay-movies transmitted via satellite. The Dallas,
Texas, cable programming ordinance bans the showing of X-
rated movies on the Dallas cable system even though such
movies have not been ruled obscene by a court. Such prior re-
straint is unconstitutional in light of recent cases77 and indi-
cates the danger to first amendment interests of citizens within
73. In 1976, about 14% of all U.S. TV households subscribed to cable television,
according to the A.C. Nielson Co. Television Ownership Estimate, 1974-80; in 1982,
BROADCASTING/CABLE YEARBOOK G-3 (1982), reported that 27% of all U.S. TV house-
holds subscribed to cable.
74. See, e.g., Dallas, Texas, ord., supra note 11.
75. Id.
76. The pertinent federal cable regulation regarding must-carry rule is 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.61, which provides: "Where a system serves a community that is located in whole
or in part within a major television market, that community unit shall carry ... on
request of the relevant station licensee ... the signals of television broadcast stations
within [a] specified zone ...." For example, Dallas, Texas, has a specified zone of a
35-mile radius.
77. See supra note 57.
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Obscenity definitions have shifted over the years. In Roth v.
United States, the Supreme Court defined obscenity by asking
"whether to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to the prurient interest." 8 The "community"
was later defined as the nation as a whole in Jacobellis v.
Ohio." Had state obscenity laws been applied to broadcasting
under Jacobellis, juries and judges within a state would have
had to assume the standards of the nation as a whole or of the
most liberal state in the country. However, Miller changed the
definition of community standard to a local one so that federal
obscenity law and state obscenity law could conflict because
the compositions of the communities were different and differ-
ent standards could therefore be inferred. The Miller court ex-
pected different judgments as to the nature of what would be
called obscene, when it said: "It is neither realistic nor consti-
tutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring
that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction
of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City."80
Any merit in this acknowledgement of diverse tastes and atti-
tudes is overcome when the application of local community
standards produces conflict among state laws applied to broad-
casting. This is so because broadcasting is inherently inter-
state and because Congress has entrusted to the FCC the
affirmative obligation to promote an effective nation-wide
system.81
78. Roth, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
79. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
80. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32.
81. Where Congress has empowered a federal agency to carry out congressional
objectives, conflicts among state laws which could hamper those objectives may justify
federal preemption. In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., the Supreme
Court found that some municipal noise controls on airports justified federal preemp-
tion because several such local laws conflicted with Environmental Protection Agency
standards and because these laws hindered the statutory objective of fostering nation-
wide commercial aviation under 49 U.S.C. § 1303. The Court inferred exclusionary con-
gressional intent, recognizing that Congress cannot foresee every possible hindrance a
state might present to a federal objective.
Broadcasting resembles interstate transportation more than other communication
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Publishers may be subjected to federal obscenity prosecu-
tion in the community where an allegedly obscene message
was either sent or received. In Hamling v. United States82 the
Supreme Court majority found that federal obscenity prosecu-
tions allowed, but did not require, the local community to be
defined within a state:
Our holding in Miller that California could constitutionally pro-
scribe obscenity in terrs of a "statewide" standard did not
mean that any such precise geographic area is required as a
matter of constitutional law.
The result of the Miller cases, therefore, as a matter of con-
stitutional law and federal statutory construction, is to permit a
juror sitting in obscenity cases to draw on knowledge of the
community or vicinage from which he comes in deciding what
conclusion "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would reach in a given case. Since this case
[Hamling I was tried in the Southern District of California, and
presumably jurors from throughout that judicial district were
available to serve on the panel which tried petitioners, it would
be the standards of that "community" upon which the jurors
would draw .... [TI his is not to say that a district court would
not be at liberty to admit evidence of standards existing in
some place outside of this particular district, if it felt such evi-
dence would assist the jurors in the resolution of the issues
which they were to decide.83
Thus, federal preemption of state obscenity law as applied to
broadcasting would not necessarily conflict with the Miller
contemporary community standards because the Miller com-
munity may cross state lines. However, if the Miller standards
were applied to broadcasting state-to-state, state laws would
most probably conflict among themselves in defining obscen-
ity. If the court were confronted with the task of reconciling
conflicting rights or interests among members of audiences sit-
uated in different states, how could that task be accomplished?
Would the sensibilities of Ohio residents be recognized as su-
media. Interstate transportation is the only medium of communication in the United
States for which Congress has created an agency to develop and regulate it.
82. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). In 1971, William Hamling and his associates in Reed Enter-
prises and Library Service, Inc., were convicted of distributing an obscene book, The
Illustrated Presidential Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography.
Hamling, et al., challenged the convictions, which were based on the pre-Miller obscen-
ity test in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), as failing to meet the Miller
tests.
83. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106.
[Vol. 5
OBSCENITY LAW AND BROADCASTING
perior to audiences in Kentucky because an offending broad-
cast station was located in Ohio? Such a result would not be a
reconciliation of conflicting rights, or interests, of all and would
contradict the Miller court's purpose in describing community
standards as local. For example, if a program originating in a
state could not be heard in a neighboring state because such
programming was found legally obscene by the assumed com-
munity standards where the broadcast originated, the effect
would be to impose a uniform standard across state lines. The
result would be opposite of what the Miller court apparently
had in mind. It is significant that the Miller court dealt with
print material rather than with broadcast programming. In
broadcast programming, defining community standards as lo-
cal is not feasible. A more logical approach is to view the com-
munity as the audience which could hear or view a broadcast
signal, regardless of the state in which the audience members
live. If community standards were defined in this way, federal
law would necessarily preempt state obscenity law when ap-
plied to broadcasting. The FCC could request prosecution by
the United States Attorney General, who could apply to any
federal district court and who could subpoena evidence of com-
munity standards from all states in which a broadcaster had an
audience.84
In Hamling, the Court had already addressed the question of
how a federal district court could accommodate the interests of
audiences outside of the district. The district court could ad-
mit evidence of community standards from any locale it chose.
A judge might instruct a jury to consider all opinions of com-
munity standards as relevant. These opinions, however, would
be used to reach only one of two conclusions-the material in
question is either patently offensive to contemporary stan-
dards of the community or it is not. Theoretically, the determi-
nation of community tastes across state lines should be no
more complex than it is withiri a state unless it is assumed that
diversity of tastes is a function of state boundaries.
As a practical matter, however, most broadcasters try to
avoid offending audiences and the FCC. Most television broad-
casters are also affiliated with networks which are their major
84. See 47 C.F.R. § 401(a), which reads in pertinent part: "The District Courts of
the United States shall have jurisdiction, upon application of the Attorney General of
the United States at the request of the Commission, alleging a failure to comply with
or a violation of any of the provisions of this Act by any person ......
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source of programming. Any affiliated station could be charged
with violation of federal obscenity law and tried in a district
court according to the community standards of the audience
which the broadcast signal reaches. Network broadcasting
does not require a national community standard in order for
federal broadcast law to preempt state obscenity law. Each
broadcast licensee is responsible for every program aired on
the licensee's station, regardless of whether the program
originated at a network.
The practical effect of federal preemption might be the same
as if there were an assumed national standard or an assumed
local community within a state, a geographical area. Under
Jenkins v. Georgia, no precise geographical area need be speci-
fied in a state case. However, in Hamling, the court identified
the relevant community standard as that community from
which the jury is drawn and as that represented by testimony
of whomever the judge considered relevant. Regardless of the
community which is identified as pertinent by a federal court,
however, federal preemption is the only way that the interests
of audiences which are interstate in nature may be considered.
IV
Conclusion
The indictment in Hamilton County, Ohio against radio sta-
tion WAIF and Zeh for violating Ohio obscenity law has raised
important questions about the authority of states to regulate
broadcasting. Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress may
preempt state law if it expressly does so or if the courts infer
an intent to preempt. Grounds of inference to preempt exist in
(1) the authority given in the Communications Act for the FCC
to establish a nationwide telecommunication system; (2) the
probability that state obscenity laws applied to broadcasting
would hinder that congressional objective because state ob-
scenity laws would conflict with each other and with federal
law; (3) the fact that FCC regulation regarding obscenity has
been judicially determined to be comprehensive, indicating
congressional intent to occupy the field; and (4) the probability
that individual states would deprive interstate audiences of
first amendment interests by applying state obscenity laws to
broadcast stations within a state. Because federal preemption
of state obscenity law applied to broadcasting would be consis-
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tent with the Miller local community standard definition of ob-
scenity in that a jury and evidence could be drawn from across
state lines, federal preemption of state laws applied to broad-
casting would not contradict prevailing Supreme Court guide-
lines for defining obscenity.
Editors Note:
The Ohio Supreme Court has refused to hear the prosecutor's appeal in the Zeh
case. See BROADCASTING, Feb. 14, 1983 at 90.
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